On November 15th around 10:06 PM UTC the hosting server was logged in to via phpmyadmin and adminer with the correct hosting management password and deleted all accounts. Noteworthy, also the account "root" has been deleted, which was injected into the database at 10:53 PM UTC and deleted at 12:50 AM, shortly after remaining databases from the chat, link list and hit counter got deleted. Unfortunately it is not possible to find the root cause by log analysis as on 14th at 5:33 the database had already been accessed with this user and it is unknown for how long the hackers may have had access to the database due to rotating logs frequently. However the database password was last updated on October 20th, which indicates that the hack must have happened within the last month. To this day around 6500 Hidden Services were hosted on the server. There is no way to recover from this breach, all data is gone. I will re-enable the service once the vulnerability has been found, but right now I first need to find it. Most likely in December the service will be back up.
The scripts are open source on github and anyone is welcome to take it as a base to build a new hosting service or help find the vulnerability.
If you are the hacker or have any helpful information about how this could have been done, please get in contact with me
Investigation is continuing. Not affected are the mail and XMPP service, as well as the static content and the short-link service, which were hosted on my Raspberry Pi 3. The chat is restored with a fresh installation and other services will be back up soon. I expect to get the hosting back up in December. In the meantime, http://fhostingineiwjg6cppciac2bemu42nwsupvvisihnczinok362qfrqd.onion is a good alternative. Might be unrelated, but on 9th November GitHub recorded a failed login on my account - Password changed anyway.
Identified vulnerabilities so far:
- https://github.com/Bo0oM/PHP_imap_open_exploit - a php zero day exploit leaked just a day before the hack - fixed in db626a54a4f5
Considerations and potential vulnerabilities:
- Add backup option as opt-in
- Require hosting dashboard login for accessing 3rd party applications
- Strictly sandbox 3rd party applications - feedback from another hoster that adminer can be used for root privilege escalation
- Chroot over open_basedir should be implemented
- Other than the root account, no accounts unrelated to the hosting were touched and unrelated files in /home/ weren't touched either. As of now there is no indication of further system access and I would classify this as a "database only" breach, with no direct access to the system. From the logs it is evident that both, adminer and phpmyadmin have been used to run queries on the database.
- LOAD DATA LOCAL could be a potential issue
- systemd.exec rules could help strengthen security
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